Sentence examples for for credence from inspiring English sources

The reason the markets for credence goods do not function well is because there are strong incentives for fraud (Darby and Karni 1973; Emons 1997; Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006).

A good example is markets for "credence goods" or goods with characteristics that are difficult or impossible for consumers to observe even after purchase and use (Darby and Karni 1973).

A putative inaccuracy measure for credence functions over an algebra \(\mathcal{F}\) is a mathematical function \(\mathfrak{I}\) that takes a credence function \(c\) in \(\mathcal{C_F}\) and a possible world \(w\) in \(\mathcal{W_F}\) and returns a number \(\mathfrak{I}(c, w)\) in \ [0, \infty]\) that measures the inaccuracy of \(c\) at \(w\).

Despite the monetary incentives for experts to defraud consumers, the turnover in markets for credence goods is huge.

Thus, the only source of disvalue for credences is their gradational inaccuracy.

Thus, we must claim, with Credal Veritism, that inaccuracy is the only source of epistemic disutility for credences.

Let us start by considering the first of the two components that comprise Joyce's account of epistemic disutility for credences, namely, Credal Veritism.

Process reliabilists can then use this measure of reliability to give an account of justification for credences: a credence is (prima facie) justified iff it is produced by a reliable credence-forming process.

So, an epistemic utility function for credences takes a credence function, together with a way the world might be, and returns a measure of the epistemic utility of having that credence function if the world were that way.

The second component of Joyce's account of epistemic disutility for credences is a set of mathematically-precise conditions that a measure of the gradational inaccuracy of a credence function at a given possible world must satisfy.

In this section, we consider the two accounts of epistemic disutility for credences given in the previous section and we combine them with decision-theoretic norms to derive epistemic norms.