Sentence examples for features of explanation from inspiring English sources

Others, including Scriven, pointed out the pragmatic features of explanation, suggesting that arguments that fall far short of deductive validity are nonetheless sufficient to "explain" a given historical event in a given context of belief.

However, some other, independent feature, $X$ (which will account for the directional features of explanation and insure the kind of explanatory relevance that is apparently missing in the birth control example) must be added to the DN model to achieve a successful account of explanation.

Recall in particular that Hempel responds to putative counterexamples that attempt to show that the DN model fails to capture the directional features of explanation by claiming that these features are to be understood in terms of "pragmatics", rather than in terms of features a traditional, non-pragmatic theory might capture.

Relatedly, part of the task of a theory of explanation is to identify those structural features of explanations (or the information they convey) in virtue of which they provide understanding.

The second premise can be challenged on the basis of rival explanations of the features of morality, explanations that do not require God.

Again the issue is how an account like Salmon's can capture this feature of successful explanation of the behavior of complex systems—how the account guides us to find the "right" level of description of the phenomena we are trying to explain.

A closely related point is that a characterization that "relativizes" some feature of an explanation to a context sometimes can, so to speak, be "de-relativized" by making it explicit how the feature in question depends on context in other words, the apparent contextuality may be just a reflection of the fact that some relevant feature has not been made explicit.

These features of Spinoza's explanation of the affects produce an associationist psychology, one that finds various causal and explanatory relations to account for the spread of the affects.

Two features of this standard explanation are noteworthy.

The serious philosophical issue can be put simply and directly: in selection explanations of adaptations, are the functions served by adaptations a central and irreducible feature of those explanations?

Many contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology believe that teleological notions are a distinctive and ineliminable feature of biological explanations but that it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of their role that avoids the concerns above.