Sentence examples for features of experiences from inspiring English sources

Even if transparency fails and there are introspectible nonrepresentational features of experiences, those features are presumably not sensory qualities.

In the past, philosophers have often appealed directly to introspection on behalf of the view that qualia are intrinsic, non-intentional features of experiences.

"Qualiaphilia" is the view that no functionalist theory of consciousness can capture phenomenal consciousness; in conscious experience one is aware of "qualia" that are not relational but rather are intrinsic features of experience in some sense.

A novel strategy that has emerged in the wake of J.J.C. Smart's discussions of identity theory is the suggestion that these apparent features of experience are not genuine properties "in the mind" or "in the world" but only the contents of mental representations (perhaps in a language of thought).

Humphrey's clever and original idea is to treat these intuitions about consciousness — this sense of ineffability, specialness, irreducibility and point of view — as simply more features of experience to be explained, the way we explain the apparent size of the moon.

These qualitative features of experience are generally referred to as qualia.

Proponents of these new Fregean modes of presentation invoke them to account for indexical features of experience contents.

Representationalism itself is a claim only about sensory qualities, while transparency is about features of experience more generally.

Traditionally qualia have been regarded as intrinsic, private, ineffable monadic features of experience, but current theories of qualia often reject at least some of those commitments (Dennett 1990).

In a world devoid of mental (and material) substances there is nothing to impart mentality (or materiality) to the given features of experience.

There are two claims here: (i) introspection reveals the mind-independent objects of experience, and (ii) introspection does not reveal non-presentational features of experience (that is, features of the character of experience not traceable merely to the appearance of some object or feature in the environment).