Sentence examples for features of experience from inspiring English sources
"Qualiaphilia" is the view that no functionalist theory of consciousness can capture phenomenal consciousness; in conscious experience one is aware of "qualia" that are not relational but rather are intrinsic features of experience in some sense.
Humphrey's clever and original idea is to treat these intuitions about consciousness — this sense of ineffability, specialness, irreducibility and point of view — as simply more features of experience to be explained, the way we explain the apparent size of the moon.
A novel strategy that has emerged in the wake of J.J.C. Smart's discussions of identity theory is the suggestion that these apparent features of experience are not genuine properties "in the mind" or "in the world" but only the contents of mental representations (perhaps in a language of thought).
These qualitative features of experience are generally referred to as qualia.
Proponents of these new Fregean modes of presentation invoke them to account for indexical features of experience contents.
Representationalism itself is a claim only about sensory qualities, while transparency is about features of experience more generally.
Even if transparency fails and there are introspectible nonrepresentational features of experiences, those features are presumably not sensory qualities.
In the past, philosophers have often appealed directly to introspection on behalf of the view that qualia are intrinsic, non-intentional features of experiences.
Thus, a spontaneous pain in the finger would be called a sensation; however, if the salient feature of experience is that of a painfully sharp, pointed object, such as a pin located "out there," it would be called a percept.
