This might be the case despite the fact that the same sentence uttered in a different context (say, in a discussion among fundamental physicists or better yet in a philosophical discussion of laws) would result in a clearly false utterance.
Nelson 2002, 2005 criticizes Richard's response, arguing that it still does not accommodate all intuitive truth-value judgments, as it still counts false some utterances that are intuitively true.
In the case of a false acceptance an utterance will be shown to the user that (s)he actually did not produce.
Bradwardine's claim is that Socrates' utterance is false, that is, that Socrates utters a falsehood.
Has the student shown that the teacher's utterance was false?
In cases where P is not common knowledge, however, the utterance is false, and public announcements of falsehoods yield an inconsistent knowledge state: the analogue of the error state in Subsection 8.2 above.
Instead, he urges us to build "a theory which will enable one to distinguish between the case in which an utterance is false or fails to be true, or more generally fails to correspond to the world in some favored way, and the case in which it is inappropriate for reasons of a different kind" (Grice 1989, 4).
But the detailed examination will only reveal what we mean if we can reliably distinguish distinguish between "the case in which an utterance is false or fails to be true, or more generally fails to correspond to the world in some favored way, and the case in which it is inappropriate for reasons of a different kind".
The goal of speaker identification is to determine which one of a group of registered speakers best matches the input speech utterance [1], whereas that of speaker verification is to determine if the claim is true or false for the input speech utterance, a claim of identity, and the corresponding speaker model [2].
