(Fumerton qualifies the analysis to accommodate false noninferentially justified beliefs, but let us ignore this for the moment).
The requirement rules out the possibility of false noninferentially justified belief, and the problem is that there seem to be plausible examples of such beliefs.
Second, the account seems too strong, for the requirement that one's thought correspond to reality rules out the possibility of false noninferentially justified belief.
He disputed Gettier's claim that any deduction from a justified, but false, proposition preserves justification.
For instance, revisionaries may contend that the false beliefs are nevertheless justified, so long as one is not aware of the defeaters that undercut our usual justification.
Therefore, since it cannot be demonstrated that Christian belief of this sort is very likely false, the Christian remains justified in maintaining that the proponents of other religious perspectives are not actually on equal epistemic footing.
In step one of Zagzebski's procedure, we imagine a case in which a subject's faculties are working properly in an appropriate environment, but the ensuing belief, though justified, is false.
What makes justified beliefs justified?
Granted that the thinker's beliefs about his environment are false, are they any less justified than in our world?
For example, they believe that feminist politics requires that claims about oppression or denial of rights be true or false and able to be justified and that philosophy requires much the same thing.
