The aims of the study were to determine the feasibility of surveying care staff regarding falls prevention, and describe care staff levels of knowledge and awareness of residents' risk of falls, knowledge about falls prevention, motivation and confidence to implement falls prevention strategies.
This is achieved by developing an accurate self-perceived risk of falls, knowledge about how to engage in suitable strategies and the ability to identify cues which alert them to engage in these falls prevention strategies.
Secondary outcome measures include falls at home after discharge, knowledge of falls prevention strategies and motivation to engage in falls prevention activities after discharge.
When a child falls ill, the knowledge of his/her caretaker regarding the natural history of the disease and the caretaker's ability to seek appropriate care for the child play a vital role in reducing the morbidity and mortality from that illness.
Thus, one might argue that what is required is an account of why knowledge is more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge not merely as a matter of degree but of kind (this is known as the tertiary value problem).
That is, Kvanvig argues that there is an epistemic standing in essence, justified true belief which falls short of knowledge but which is no less valuable than knowledge.
Secondary outcome measures for participants in the home follow up sub-trial at the SDH site include a pre-discharge assessment using a survey (see additional file 1) of their self perceived risk of falls and falls injuries, knowledge about falls mechanisms, awareness of strategies to prevent falls at home and confidence and motivation to prevent falls at home after discharge.
After all, one could respond to the secondary value problem by arguing that knowledge is more valuable as a matter of degree than that which falls short of knowledge.
Science, in the sense of knowledge, falls into one of three kinds: (i) that which is primarily oriented to and necessary for salvation; (ii) that which is useful in the search for truth and righteous living for living an honest life but not sufficient for salvation; (iii) that which is useless in both respects and is connected with vanity (DOS 1 2).
More specifically (though he does not put the point in these terms), the answer to the value problem offered by virtue epistemology on this construal is able to respond to not only the secondary value problem but also the tertiary value problem (i.e., the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable, in kind and not merely in degree, than that which falls short of knowledge).
