For once, Kate's straight-arrow methods fail her, truth being an arbitrary concept in a community where local custom dictates justice.
Truth-maker optimalism is the intermediate position that only some truths stand in need of truth-makers: not so few that truth fails to be anchored in reality but not so many that we strain credulity about the kinds of things there are.
For yet another example, Staffan Angere (2007, 2008) has argued, based on computer simulations, that the fact that coherence fails to be truth conducive, in the above sense, does not prevent it from being connected with truth in a weaker, defeasible sense.
In natural language semantics, an intensional context is one where substitution of co-extensional terms fails to preserve truth value (Scott is Scott is true, and Scott is the author of Waverley is true, but the truth of George knows that Scott is Scott doesn't guarantee the truth of George knows that Scott is the author of Waverly, so knows that establishes an intensional context).
It is ironic, Flynn notes, that it is anti-epistemologists like Nietzsche who make this argument, claiming that ethical believers fail a truth-test when in fact those believers are not interested in truth-testing at all.
Nevertheless, it is important to see that this response does involve a burden, since it involves rejecting a condition of adequacy that many regard as binding on a theory of truth Philosophy of language has isolated a class of propositions that are supposed to fail of truth-value.
Where truth fails, fiction flourishes.
"Doesn't it look like your colleague?" The truth fails to come out in the wash.
But what if you have a son like A's, an Albee stand-in, who yells "Fake!" and "NO!" when the truth fails to reveal itself to his mother.
Not infrequently, pluralism about truth fails to be distinguished from various other theses about associated conceptual, pragmatic, linguistic, and semantic phenomena.
