Sentence examples for facie content from inspiring English sources

Some architectural theory of the late twentieth century embraced one or another form of post-structuralist Continental thought one central claim of which is that texts and other cultural artifacts have meanings and references beyond their prima facie content.

So, there appear to be cases in which BTT could make prima facie incorrect content assignments.

The only other apparent possible defense of the thesis that intuitions prima facie justify belief in their content appeals, as does the traditional rationalist, to the fact that there are many particular propositions which one seems justified in believing simply in virtue of their being the content of a rational intuition (Bealer 1998; Bonjour 1998).

That explanation, when conjoined with our prima facie justification for believing the contents of our intuitions (and our being prima facie justified isn't challenged on this construal of the argument) seems to suffice as an explanation of our reliability.

Second, if we focus on the question of whether we are prima facie justified in accepting the contents of our intuitions, there may be a feature which distinguishes intuition from all other putative sources of evidence.

An important conception of the architecture of perceptual justification, called dogmatism in Pryor (2000 and 2004), embraces a generalised form of liberalism about perceptual justification by stating that our experiences give us immediate and prima facie justification for believing their contents.

This defense may be generalized by claiming that intuition is self-supporting insofar as the general claim that intuitions provide prima facie justification for belief in their contents is itself intuitive.

According to perceptual dogmatism, a person having a perceptual experience or a perceptual seeming with propositional content p is thereby prima facie justified in believing p (Pryor 2000).

Such laws are considered prima facie unconstitutional and are considered an egregious form of content discrimination based on the rights enshrined within the first amendment.

Instead, Sawyer's view seems similar to that of W., where speakers are given a prima facie (albeit quite defeasible) warrant when ascribing their own mental contents.

Functions, thus, provide a prima facie attractive means of properly winnowing down the causes of "X" to those that are genuinely content determining.