Sentence examples for external sentences from inspiring English sources

One may call sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" or "Hamlet hates his stepfather" "internal sentences of fictional discourse", in distinction from external sentences of fictional discourse, like "Pegasus is a character from Greek mythology" or "Hamlet has fascinated many psychoanalysts".

The story operator strategy can be applied to internal sentences only and thus fails as a general solution to the problem of fictional discourse.[8] The claim that there are nonexistent objects provides a solution that can be applied uniformly both to internal and external sentences of fictional discourse.

Examples of external sentence tokens were given in the last paragraph — piles of ink, sound waves, and so on.

Now, one might hold a physicalistic view here according to which linguistics is about actual (external) sentence tokens, e.g., piles of ink and verbal sound waves.

And, second, there is the physicalistic view that belief reports involve references to external sentence tokens, i.e., to piles of ink, and so on (versions of this view have been endorsed by Carnap (1947), Davidson (1967), and Leeds (1979)).

(Findlay 1963, 49) It is worth noticing that there are two interpretations of negation (narrower, internal, predicate, or ontological negation versus wider, external, sentence, logical negation), and accordingly there are two versions of the law of excluded middle.

For the antirealist, the semantics of names presents an important hurdle to attempts to accommodate the truth of internal and external metafictional sentences featuring fictional names.

Once external metafictional sentences are read this way, any apparent commitment to fictional entities seems to disappear, provided once again that the resulting complex sentences are read de dicto.

Now, it is certainly true that insisting on the need to preserve the validity of the above inferences in any account of external metafictional sentences is a good antidote to the antirealist 'paraphrase' strategy.

But they disagree about external metafictional sentences like "Holmes is a fictional character", with Adams et al. insisting that these too can be true despite the names being non-referring, and Braun (2005) arguing that such statements call for a creationist position on which the names in such sentences refer to genuine, created fictional entities.

This is because we expected no intrusion of syntactical sentence external material into sentence processing, precluding any interaction.