Similarly, you will come to have a visual experience that represents the sky as yellow.
For you and I are surely representationally different here: for example, you have a visual experience that represents red when I have one that represents green.
According to the (orthodox) representationalist, an experience has \(Q_{B}\), say, just in case it is an experience that represents blue.
So according to this evidentialism, what makes you justified in believing that p is your having an experience that represents p as being true.
For example, the property of being a visual experience that represents that there is a crimson square before one is a representational property (for a taxonomy of representational properties, see Chalmers 2004, section 2).
The issue is which of these properties can be perceived as being instantiated: e.g., whether one can have a visual experience that represents that someone is trying to do something.
However, by way of illustration, if an agent perceives an object o as red, and so has a perceptual experience that represents o as being red, the agent predicates redness of o.
Martin argues that if the dependency thesis is correct, then the intentionalist should hold that when we visualise, we imagine a mental state (i.e., a visual experience) that represents the world to be a certain way and that has a distinctive kind of functional role.
But when you find the heart of your story, the kernel of your unique experience that represents your very best self, the story will leap off the page.
(iii) Hold that there are contents shared by G-experiences that represent redness and G-experiences that represent greenness.
