Searle's proposal predicts that the cube experience is falsidical, because the fact that there is a red cube at L is not causing your experience, and the second clause of his complex existentially quantified contents says that it is.
I assumed that it would (my experience with sugar cubes is frighteningly limited), but of course it doesn't.
Figure 9B shows, in elevation, an enlarged view of an infinitesimal element of the fluid of cubic shape, and the directions of the forces experienced by this cube associated with σ12 are indicated by arrows.
The drag force experienced by a cube in a plane turbulent wall jet is also determined.
Now if the only shear stress acting on the cubic element of fluid sketched in Figure 9B were σ12, the cube would experience a torque tending to make it twist in a clockwise sense.
For instance, if one has a visual experience representing a red cube, the contents of experience on this view would be a set of possible worlds in which there really is a red cube in front of you.
For instance, if one has a visual experience representing a red cube, the contents of experience on this view would be the structured proposition containing the object one sees that looks like a red cube and the property of being a red cube.
Going with these differences, there seems to be a phenomenal difference between the experience of seeing a red cube to your left and seeing a red cube to your right.
Bistable stimuli, such as the Necker Cube, demonstrate that experience can change in the absence of changes in the environment.
We will continue to work on creating the best personalized experience out there, our data cube also plays a big role in our exploration of routes to monetization.
