The difference between a hippie and someone who considers themselves part of the cannabis movement was a non-existent distinction in the beginning.
That there is indeed a difference between "being existing (existent)" and "to exist" can be made clear by a distinction Meinong took over from Mally, the distinction between two kinds of properties (determinations), nuclear versus extra-nuclear properties [konstitutorische versus außerkonstitutorische Bestimmungen] (1915, §25).
And if we are allowed to keep some structure on the domain of worlds or times fixed, the question immediately arises why we should not also keep some structure on the domain of objects fixed: for example, the set-theoretic membership relation, the mereological part/whole relation, or the distinction between existent and nonexistent objects (see the entry on free logics).
First, there is the distinction between being existent, good, wise, and so on, essentially, and being existent, good, wise, and so on, by participation.
Whatever is non-existent remains non-existent for ever and whatever is existent always exists.
In Buddhist philosophical thought preceding Nāgārjuna we find the distinction between primary existents (dravyasat) and secondary existents (prajñaptisat).
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This amounts to saying that the high-low applicative distinction is non-existent and that all applicatives are high applicatives.
Another often-ignored distinction is that the existent in the existential may be either a thing or an event.
The core of the distinction is that what is necessarily existent is purely existence (but not undetermined common existence) and is indeed the Necessarily Existent Principle.
These distinctions thus reveal the inner complex of relations that explain existence: not only are the notions of existent and thing primary, but so are those of unity, necessity and to some extent possibility (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 29, 5 6; 3 4 3 4; 35, 3–4 536, 4 5).
