Ryle is inclined only to call the exercise of the latter ability an exercise of knowledge-how.
If all exercise of knowledge-how is preceded by a prior consideration of a proposition, the prior consideration is an act.
But the act will only count as an exercise of knowledge-how will only count as an intelligent act—if our consideration of the proposition is something we knowledge-how will isn't itself nonlyntelligent.
If our consideration of the proposition is somehow accidental or related in a haphazard way to the performance of the act, then the act won't count as intelligent or an exercise of knowledge-how.
Therefore, the consideration of the act had itself better be an exercise of knowledge-how and so had better if intellectualism is right be preceded by another consideration of a proposition.
Some scholars (e.g., Sax 2010 and Rosefeldt 2004) think that Ryle should only be taken as attempting to show the minimal conclusion that Ginet grants: that not all exercises of knowledge-how are preceded by intelligent consideration of propositions.
Holders of expert knowledge are supposed to be reliable in the exercise of that knowledge; they are professionals, and part of their professionalism is to ply their trade competently regardless of the weight of passion or the blandishments of pleasure.
Whereas sensorimotor enactivism advocates that perceptual experience is made possible by the possession and skillful exercise of practical knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies, the other variants consider the talk of mediating knowledge as a brand of cognitivism (Hutto and Myin 2003), somewhat consistent with the theory of mind that grounds traditional cognitive science.
According to the model suggested by this supposed dichotomy, exercises of theoretical knowledge involve active reflection, engagement with the propositions or rules of the theory in question that guides the subsequent exercise of the knowledge.
A mathematician's proof of a theorem is the ideal example of the exercise of theoretical knowledge.
