Despite the powerful criticisms of the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711 76)—e.g., that the evidence is compatible with a large number of hypotheses, such as polytheism or a god of limited power, that are as plausible as or more plausible than monotheism the argument from design continued to be very popular in the 19th century.
Still, the evidence is compatible with the existence of a being of limited power and/or intelligence but unlimited benevolence.
Given this, one might worry that a view according to which perfectly following one's evidence is compatible with a more or less completely mistaken view of one's situation threatens to render obscure why following one's evidence would be a good thing to do relative to the goal of having true rather than false beliefs.
More specifically, it suggests that we can take persuasive impressions as evidence for the truth that is firm enough to warrant assent — thus allowing for a life guided by reasoned belief, and even ethical teaching — while simultaneously maintaining that even the most perfect rational consideration of the evidence is compatible with wholesale error.
Most of the pre-existing evidence is compatible with the findings of this systematic review (Sitzmann, 2011; Connolly et al., 2012; Wouters et al., 2013; Ritzhaupt et al., 2014; Gegenfurtner et al., 2014; Shin et al., 2015; Lameras et al., 2016; Carenys & Moya, 2016; Fu et al., 2016; Warren et al., 2016).
All this evidence is compatible with the coevolution theory (see, for instance, reference [ 31] and replies to Reviewer 3).
Much of the available neurophysiological evidence is compatible with abstract cascaded interactive models (Dell, 1986; Dell et al., 1997; MacKay, 1987) if the activation delays between phonological/orthographic, lexical, syntactic and semantic "nodes" are assumed to be short.
Gliniana et al. have also concluded that the available evidence is compatible with either a small adverse effect of particulate air pollution on foetal growth and duration of pregnancy or with no effect (28).
If a new trial result demonstrates an intervention effect closer to zero than prior evidence indicates, a high Bayes factor will demonstrate that there is a low probability that the intervention effect indicated by prior evidence is compatible with the new trial result.
