Sentence examples for equilibrium reasoning from inspiring English sources

Similar models of deregulated electricity markets are being developed by a handful of researchers around the world, who see them as the only way of reckoning intelligently with the design of extremely complex deregulated electricity markets, where faith in the reliability of equilibrium reasoning has already led to several disasters, in California, notoriously, and more recently in Texas.

Moral consistency reasoning, as it is called, can support but it can also undermine wide reflective equilibrium reasoning.

They are so engaged but are rejecting a common presupposition namely, that public justification has some specific forms (discourse, negotiation, deliberation) in favor of the broader conception of justification associated with equilibrium reasoning.

Still others argue that wide reflective equilibrium reasoning should not be confused with a different but complementary reasoning that directly compares opposing moral judgments about particular but similar cases without reference to general principles.

Since each bookmaker gets zero in equilibrium, following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3, the minimal commission (c=min _{kin K}c_k) is characterized as follows: Risk-adverse case: (0=u_k = (1-rho )left( min {1-pi,pi }c-upsilon right) gamma )   Risk-neutral case: (0=u_k = (1-rho )left( (q+pi -2qpi )c-upsilon right) gamma )  where c, (pi ) and (gamma ) satisfy (9).

Subjects with low reasoning ability make choices away from equilibrium.

The hope is that, if we assume enough common knowledge among players about the game's payoff structure and their own rationality, then, through relatively a priori reasoning, they can successfully predict which equilibrium others will select.

We discuss the characterization of the Nash equilibrium, incorporate considerations of weak dominance into the players' reasoning and allow the players to be unaware, as opposed to uncertain, about some aspects of the game.

Now, the same reasoning as that used for the susceptible endemic equilibrium component is applied to (3.18) to conclude that, since there is a nonzero vaccinated population for at most two endemic equilibrium points with, then (3.19).

Because we assume that SSRs are at equilibrium, the existence of other states does not alter the following reasoning.

But forward induction reasoning seems to imply that if any off-equilibrium node had been reached, common knowledge of rationality and the game must have failed, so how could the agents have predicted what would happen at these nodes?