(For a survey of views that could fall under the heading of "raw feel theory" as used here, see entry on contents of perception (section 2.1).
For further discussion of narrow content, see the entry on narrow content.
The intentional content of perception is sometimes called "perceptual content" (see the entry on the contents of perception).
The non-expert is able to refer to the species only by using the word with an attitude of linguistic deference to these experts, who become in effect linguistic authorities (Putnam 1975 and Burge 1979; see the entries on narrow mental content and externalism about mental content).
Theorists of nonconceptual content have canvassed several types of reasons for thinking that this propositional content does not exhaust the representational content of perception (see the entry on the contents of perception).[6] First, it has been argued that the contents of perception exhibit certain features that cannot be exhibited by the contents of the propositional attitudes.
On this way of setting up the issues, an experience has "propositional content" by having content that is assessable for truth (for further discussion of how to clarify the idea that experiences have propositional content, see the entry on the contents of perception; Byrne 2009; Pautz 2009; or Siegel 2012).
(See the entry on narrow content, and further discussion below).
Other philosophers do not reject EXT as much as restrict it: They posit a kind of content so called "narrow" content which is determined independently of the environment (Block 1986, Loar 1988, Georgalis 1994 19999, Chalmers 1996; 2002, Jackson 1998, Siewart 1998, Horgan & Tienson 2002, Wikforss 2007, Mendola 2008; see also the entry on narrow content).
There is no consensus, however, about just how functionalist theories should treat these "narrow" representational features (Block 1986; Loar 1987), and some philosophers have expressed skepticism about whether such features should be construed as representations at all (Fodor 1994; also see entry on Narrow Content).
(As noted earlier, there are also other recent accounts of perceptual experience and its contents — see the entry on the contents of perception. But there seems to be no reason to think that these have any more interesting epistemological implications than does disjunctivism).
