In particular, the descriptivist theory of meaning (as opposed to the more modest descriptivist theory of reference) can easily account for the non-triviality of identity statements involving co-referring names, sentences containing empty names, sentences containing true negative existentials, and propositional attitude reports.
The Texas appellate court has held that the facts of the original crime – which have to be proven at the preceding "guilt-innocence" stage of a trial – may be sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant could be a future danger, an approach that empties the sentencing hearing of any significance.
The thought of picking apart the turgid, empty, "cleverly written" sentences of "proper" fiction fills me with horror.
Short paragraphs, empty pages, disconnected sentences printed alone add an expressionistic, almost filmic quality to the already stark narrative.
But this is surprising; it seems that we can use empty names in sentences to express propositions and form beliefs about the world.
If I introduce the name 'Herman' stipulating that it refers to the one and only monster under my bed, I introduce an empty name; and sentences containing 'Herman' should not thereby be ontologically committed to monsters.
Similarly, if I introduce a predicate 'whish' stipulating that it expresses a biological kind property that applies to whales and fish but excludes rabbits and rhinoceri, I introduce an empty predicate; and sentences containing 'whish' should not thereby be ontologically committed to any biological kinds.
Kotarbiński believes that (8) is meaningful, unlike (7), and that this shows that sentences with empty names are already reistic, unlike sentences with onomatoids, which are meaningless.
The spectrum of an unsatisfiable sentence is empty.
According to the truth conditions for quantifiers in inclusive logic, all universal sentences are true in an empty domain, and all existential sentences are false.
