As McDowell says, the capacity for employing demonstrative concepts in perception is a recognitional capacity (McDowell 1994a p. 57, Brewer 1999 also holds that a conceptual capacity must be available in the absence of the sample to which it was initially applied).
In place of the exclusive reliance on the hypothetical-deductive method these theorists employ non-demonstrative analogical and causal inductive reasoning to ground theoretical statements empirically.
Note that the explanatory role that Campbell is suggesting that our conscious experience of objects is supposed to play isn't simply that of justifying, or providing warrant for, our beliefs and judgements that employ perceptual demonstratives.
But even here the holder of the theory ought not only to assert the fact: he ought to explain the cause of it: i.e. he should not make any mere assumption or lay down any gratuitous axiom, but should employ either inductive or demonstrative reasoning.
Here, we employ a non-traditional, highly demonstrative design of a molecular epidemiological study, where the comparison of BC cases and healthy middle-aged female donors was supplemented by an analysis of groups with extreme characteristics of either BC risk (bilateral breast cancer (biBC) patients) or cancer tolerance (tumour-free elderly women aged ⩾75 years).
Initially he followed the example of Weigel, his Cartesian mentor at Jena (whose own Arithmetic Description of Moral Wisdom about Persons and Things [Arithmetische Beschreibung der Moral-Weißheit Moral-Weißheit von Personenpeared only in 1674; see Weigel 2003), by employing a qundi-mathematical approach that aSachen to demonstrative certitude in moral matters in place of Aristotelian probabilism.
As a demonstrative example, the discrete weak gradient operator is employed as a building block in the design of numerical schemes for a second order elliptic problem, in which the classical gradient operator is replaced by the discrete weak gradient.
He does not realise this, because the concepts employed to capture experience (such as 'looks red' or 'sounds C-sharp') are similar to demonstratives, and demonstrative concepts lack the kind of descriptive content that allow one to infer what they express from other pieces of information that one may already possess.
These results show that when a source of variance due to the differences between measurement methods employed in the different studies is eliminated, there is a consistent reduction of the effect size (which is still demonstrative of a statistically significant difference between groups) accompanied by a reduction to almost half of the heterogeneity.
It has to be demonstrative.
