The idea that sense impressions form the immediate objects of perception played a large role in early analytic philosophy, showing once again its empiricist roots.
Memories of the painter's early Analytic Cubism period may be recognized in the juxtaposition of the woman's profile and the other side of her face seen three-quarters.
For a collection of early analytic work in Latin America, see Gracia et al. (1984).
The correspondence is nonetheless very interesting for it offers a window onto the origins of early analytic philosophy.
The emergence of logical analysis as the distinctive form of analysis in early analytic philosophy is outlined in §6 of the main document.
While hugely important in the development of logic, philosophy of mathematics and more broadly of "Early Analytic Philosophy", the work itself is no longer studied for these topics.
However, a later generation of French philosophers coming to prominence in the 1960s tended to react against Hegel in ways analogous to those in which early analytic philosophers had reacted against the Hegel who had influenced their predecessors.
Early analytic philosophers such as Ryle, Ayer and Russell, rejected the metaphysical project, a project which they associated with classical rationalism and its revival at the hands of Hegel and the British Idealists.
Given the understanding of Hegel that predominated at the time of the birth of analytic philosophy, together with the fact that early analytic philosophers were rebelling precisely against Hegelianism so understood, the interpretation of Hegel encountered in discussions within analytic philosophy is often that of the late nineteenth-century interpretation.
But not only did early analytic philosophers reject this kind of metaphysics, they also refused to acknowledge the possibility of another kind of metaphysics, a 'metaphysics of experience' or what Collingwood calls, in An Essay on Metaphysics, a metaphysics of absolute presuppositions.
