If one defines a right rather thinly as what one has whenever one has justifiable claims on others to assure one's possession of things or one's exercise of certain capacities, then one can plausibly argue that there is a common notion of rights between the Chinese and Western traditions (Wong, 2004).
If we carry the reasoning in Mencius and Xunzi one step further, we see the need to protect a space in which they may speak freely without fear of suppression, and hence a derive a right in the "thin" sense of what one has whenever one has justifiable claims on others to assure one's possession of things or one's exercise of certain capacities.
Mr. Simmons first entered the fray on May 8, when he attended a rally to protest the 30th anniversary of the passage of the drug laws, which impose long mandatory minimum sentences based on the weight of drugs in one's possession rather than on the role one played in a drug-dealing operation.
It is an offence to carry, or have in one's possession or under one's control in a security area without lawful excuse, any firearm, ammunition or explosive without lawful authority.
Although the normative notion of evidence cannot simply be identified with the indicator notion, we would expect the two to be closely linked, inasmuch as one's possession of normative evidence frequently depends upon one's awareness that one thing is indicator evidence of something else.
Many Evidentialists (Locke, Hume, and Clifford, for example) add the condition that the amount of evidence in one's possession must be proportioned to one's degree of belief, and that one should only firmly believe on the basis of "sufficient" evidence (where "sufficient" involves the evidence being strong enough for the belief to count as knowledge if true).
It seems that E might count as evidence for H relative to the set of propositions that one believes but not relative to the set of propositions that one knows (or vice versa)—which of these, if either, determines whether E is evidence for H, in the sense that one's possession of E tends to justify one in believing that H is true?
The central principle, as mentioned earlier, is that one ought only to base one's beliefs on relevant evidence (i.e. evidence that bears on the truth of the proposition) that is in one's possession.
It is possible to create wish lists (by pushing the "want it" button on the picture) or indicating/sharing objects that are already in one's possession (by clicking "have it").
Even if there are particular cases in which it is imprudent to follow one's evidence, the general rule that one should believe on the basis of, and in proportion to, sufficient evidence in one's possession produces the best distribution of prudential outcomes overall.
Nor is it even clear that we must judge the sufficiency of phenomenal character for intentionality by adopting some general account of content and its individuation (as 'narrow' or 'wide' for instance), and then ask whether one's possession of content so considered is entailed by the phenomenal character of one's experience.
