In his Doctrine of Science (1794/95) and in the First and Second Introduction into the Doctrine of Science (1797) he famously set out to demonstrate that the primordial act of self-positing lies at the basis of all reality.
It was the need to respond to the sharp criticisms of these authors that eventually led Fichte to construct his own, unique version of transcendental idealism, for which, in the spring of 1794, he eventually coined the name Wissenschaftslehre ("Doctrine of Science" or "Theory of Scientific Knowledge").
While constructive empiricism has not gained a wide number of adherents, it continues to be a highly influential doctrine in philosophy of science.
In later decades the Austrian economists opposed the ascendance of positivist and other radically empiricist doctrines within the philosophy of science.
As a kind of meeting point for medieval and modern worldviews, it accepted the doctrines of Renaissance science while attempting to ground them metaphysically in medieval notions of God and the human mind.
A unique feature of the development of Indian thought was the systematization of each school of thought in the form of sutras, or extremely concise expressions, intended to reduce the doctrines of a science or of a philosophy into a number of memorizable aphorisms, formulas, or rules.
Empirical content is not something we hear about very much these days in philosophy of science after the receding of Popperian and Lakatosian doctrines, but for Bridgman it was one of the key issues.
More generally, although twentieth-century history and philosophy of science did not always take seriously Cohen's substantive doctrines, it was nevertheless affected profoundly by his vision of philosophy as the reconstruction of historical developments in mathematically-precise natural science.
Kuhn's contribution to the philosophy of science marked not only a break with several key positivist doctrines, but also inaugurated a new style of philosophy of science that brought it closer to the history of science.
As Cohen would later put it, experience, conceived as the evolving doctrines of mathematical natural science, is "given as a task" [aufgegeben] to philosophy: while experience is given with synthetic a priori principles already contained in it, it is the task of philosophy to identify and articulate those principles, and in so doing to explain how they make objective experience possible.
