The problem here will be whether the science will reliably distinguish thoughts that describe fantasies or imaginings rather than real dirty deeds done.
As the last clause in the sentence makes clear, Collingwood's account of re-enactment is designed to establish a conceptual point about what thought is and a related point about the criteria for identifying and distinguishing thoughts, not a method for the recovery of past thoughts (Saari 1984 and 1989; Van der Dussen 1981 and 1995; D'Oro 2000).
This is because one must be able to distinguish thoughts from actions.
In habitual tasks, such as taking medicine every few hours, the same PM task is performed regularly and thus it is essential that the individual is able to distinguish thoughts (i.e., thinking about taking the medicine) from actions (i.e., actually taking the medicine).
These are to be distinguished from thoughts (e.g., "I feel I didn't get a fair deal") and from words colloquially used as feelings but which convey what we think we are (e.g., "inadequate"), how we think others are evaluating us (e.g., "unimportant"), or what we think others are doing to us (e.g., "misunderstood", "ignored").
All the same, in distinguishing between thoughts possessed of consciousness and thoughts of which we are reflectively aware, Descartes opened a space for conscious thoughts that we don't notice or remember.
Something like this consequence is drawn by Putnam (1981), who takes the stream of consciousness to comprise nothing more than sensations and images, which (as Frege saw) should be sharply distinguished from thought and meaning.
One patient distinguished between "being thoughts," when these thoughts were permeated by her sense of self, and "having thoughts," when thoughts were experienced as introspectible, thing-like objects.
It can be difficult to distinguish the thoughts I attach to another, but that are really my own, and the thoughts and emotions that belong to the other person.
These show that in laboratory tests the Epoc performed "significantly better than chance", suggesting that the system could distinguish intentional thoughts from other mental activity and artefacts, such as muscle movement.
