Much of this will represent descending predictions of cutaneous sensation, and may act to cancel or attenuate sensations caused by the body's own movements, in order to distinguish sensations resulting from external agencies (Blakemore et al. 2000; Cullen 2004).
Here it helps to recall that Kant distinguishes sensation from intuition.
If we rigorously distinguish sensation from intuition à la Kant, then we open the possibility of objective representations that are akin to perceptions.
MacPherson and Asghar distinguished the sensations of Park's scale with regard to whether they were associated with deqi or with pain using a rating which was developed by an international group of acupuncture experts.
For example, it is suggested to participants that they might notice any sensations in the abdominal area and distinguish those sensations from thoughts about sensations.
So what necessarily distinguishes remembered sensation from current sensation, on this account, is just that remembered sensations are of what "was".
David Armstrong (1962) proposes distinguishing bodily sensations, like pain and touch, which are experienced as being located in a particular part of the body and bodily feelings, like hunger, thirst and tiredness, which are not.
Within the category of bodily sensations, he then distinguishes transitive bodily sensations, in which there is an object independent of the sensations (for example, tactile sensations), and intransitive bodily sensations, in which there does not seem to be such an independent object (for example, tickles).
Both science and reflection on everyday experience thus distinguish mere sensation proper from hedonic reaction (cf. Aydede 2000).
It is improbable that we can interpret this idea correctly unless we remind ourselves that Kant rigorously distinguishes between sensation and intuition.
