Sentence examples for distinguished moral from inspiring English sources

"One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit," Harry G. Frankfurt, a distinguished moral philosopher who is professor emeritus at Princeton, says.

These fundamental ethical questions were all up for debate recently as distinguished moral philosophers gathered at MIT on June 11, for a daylong conference on Normativity — a groundbreaking treatise by MIT philosophy professor emeritus Judith Jarvis Thomson.

Fundamental ethical questions were up for debate recently as distinguished moral philosophers gathered at MIT for a daylong conference on Normativity — a groundbreaking 2008 treatise by MIT philosophy professor emeritus Judith Jarvis Thomson.

For Smith had written an earlier book--The Theory of Moral Sentiments (published in 1759, hence predating Wealth of Nations by seventeen years --and from that he was known as a distinguished moral philosopher long before he ever gained fame as an economic theoretician.

First, there is little discussion on what distinguishes moral bioenhancement from treatment of pathological deficiencies in morality.

He doesn't find it necessary to elucidate how society should distinguish moral from immoral sentiments, or from prejudices that happen to have mass appeal.

In fact, Mr. Cavell distinguishes moral perfectionism from the notion that there is a fixed, ideal moral law (as Kant proposed) or that moral judgment should be utilitarian, or useful (as John Stuart Mill proposed).

Moore expressed the realist side of his non-naturalism by saying that fundamental moral judgements ascribe the property of goodness to states of affairs, though especially in Principia Ethica he tended not to distinguish moral concepts and moral properties.

The last possible strategy for the deontologist in order to deal with dire consequences, other than by denying their existence, as per Taurek, is to distinguish moral reasons from all-things-considered reasons and to argue that whereas moral reasons dictate obedience to deontological norms even at the cost of catastrophic consequences, all-things-considered reasons dictate otherwise.

He also offers the argument that since the chain of reasons why one acts must finally stop at something that is "desirable on its own account… because of its immediate accord or agreement with sentiment…" (EPM App.1.19), sentiment is needed to account for ultimate human ends; and since virtue is an end, sentiment and not reason alone must distinguish moral good and evil.

If neo-sentimentalists are right, to think that something is wrong, for example, is to think that guilt is fitting for doing it but, Nichols claims, children who distinguish moral from conventional violations do not yet possess the concept of guilt.