Yet attempts to state how Wittgenstein could deny the privacy of experience without espousing some form of behaviourism which treats emotions, desires, and attitudes as dispositions to behave in certain ways—have not been very successful.
He claimed that qualia are neither behavior nor dispositions to behave.
Qualitative mental events (such as sensations, perceptual experiences, and so on), for Place, undergird dispositions to behave rather than count as dispositions.
Behaviorism in the philosophy of mind is the view that the mental is nothing over and above behavior (including dispositions to behave).
Even where there is no behaviour of the relevant kind, there may still be dispositions to behave in those ways under certain unrealized circumstances.
The objectors say that the situationists rely on an understanding of character traits as isolated and often non-reflective dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways.
Global traits involve dispositions to behave in certain ways regardless of the situation or at least across a wide range of situations.
We also speculate about, discuss, recall and evaluate people's dispositions to behave in certain ways and to have certain mental states; that is, we consider their character traits.
That is, while an electron, for example, is said to possess "spin", all this amounts to is that the electron has certain dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances.
Just acknowledge, e.g., some brute counterfactual facts about sense data, or brute dispositions to behave in one way or another, or brute facts about what happened in the past or will happen in the future.
