Specifically, we formulate the discrimination term based on factors analysis.
The impact of the discrimination term (d) is not directly observable because only unprejudiced firms are interested in hiring Red workers.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the discrimination term does not appear directly in the reaction function of unprejudiced firms: their reaction function is the same for Greens and Reds, and the wage gap comes from the term reflecting neighboring wages.
end{aligned} (28)To identify which one is the optimal solution (i.e., either (T_1^*) or (T_2^*)), let us define the discrimination term begin{aligned} Delta _T=+frac{K(h+theta c)}{theta ^2}{mathrm{e}}^{aN}Big ({mathrm{e}}^{theta (M-N }-1-theta (M-N }-1-theta}}^{theta M-N }-1-thetarac{sI_{M-N }-1-thetaN)^2}{2}K{M-N {mathrm{e}}.
end{aligned} (37 To identify whether (N_2^*) is 0 or positive, let us use (36) to define the discrimination term begin{aligned} Delta _{N_2}=, & [a-(b+r)]s-frac{ac}{theta T}({mathrm{e}}^{theta T}-1 -frac{ah}{T}-1 -frac{ahaT}-1 -frac{ahta T}{thetata T)+sI_{mathrm{e}}aBig (M-N-frac{T}{2}Big )-sI_{mathrm{e}}.
To identify whether N is 0 or positive, we define the following discrimination term: begin{aligned}&Delta _{N_1}=frac{partial Pi _(N|T)}{partial N}|_{N=0}= -krho -kbT/2+rho ')s nonumber &-crho '-frac{hrho 'T}= -krhoac{sI_{rm{e}}}{2}[2(M-kbT/2+rhobT+2rho )-rho 'T].
end{aligned} (9)Hence, for any given N, (Pi _1(T|N)) is strictly concave function of T. For simplicity, let's define a discrimination term: begin{aligned} Delta =frac{[se^{-kN}-c+sI_{rm{e}} M-N ]b- (h+sI_{rm{e} M-N ]b}{2} (M-N)^2 -frac{2}{3}(h+sI_{rm{e}})b(M-N)^3 +A.
end{aligned} (50 For simplicity, let us define another discrimination term begin{aligned} Delta _{N_3}= [a-(b+r)]s-frac{ac}{theta T}({mathrm{e}}^{theta T}-1 -frac{ah}{T}-1 -frac{ah{T}-1 -frac{aheta T)-cI_mathrm{c}{thetarac{aT}{2} +1Big ).
Neither CURB-65 or CRB-65 nor CCI allow excellent discrimination in terms of predicting longer term mortality.
This paper compares three contract forms, including short-term contract with price discrimination, short-term contract without price discrimination, and long-term contract with price commitment for consumers with switching costs and changed preferences.
