This is interesting, not least because Saunders has developed a form of PII, based on Quine's suggestions about discernibility, which allows objects to be 'weakly' discernible in relational terms (Saunders 2003a and 2006; for a useful overview see Bigaj 2015).
However, each enters into the symmetric but irreflexive relation of 'having opposite direction of each component of spin to …' on the basis of which they can be said to be 'weakly discernible' (for general discussions of different kinds of discernibility see Caulton and Butterfield 2012a; Bigaj 2014; Ketland 2011; Ladyman, Linnebo and Pettigrew 2012).
Recorded speech, usually muffled or distorted beyond discernibility, served as binding material throughout most of the roughly half-hour piece.
Again and again the room and its objects — a chair, a sofa, a roaming cat — become visible, hover at the edge of discernibility or are nearly swallowed in black.
Muller, for example, has suggested that this whole discussion of weak discernibility reveals a category of entity that has received little attention so far, namely that of 'relationals': objects that can be discerned by means of relations only (Muller 2011, 2015).
One might, for example, appeal to some metaphysical factor or other in support of one package over the other, or shift to meta-metaphysical considerations in order to argue, for example, that individuality based on weak discernibility has certain advantages over rival accounts and also over non-individuality, with its attendant non-standard formal underpinning.
From this perspective, both the individuality and non-individuality packages get off on the wrong feet, as it were, by assuming that the way the world is, according to physics, is a world of objects, which can either be regarded as individuals, whether primitively or via weak discernibility, or as non-individuals, whether formally represented through quasi-set theory or not.
The notion of 'weak discernibility' applies to objects that satisfy some irreflexive relation (a relation such that xRx does not obtain for every x).
Now, when one speaks of the unification (and discernibility) of two natures in Christ, this cannot be meant to say that the universal natures of godhead and manhood have been unified in Christ (else it would be also true to say that not only the Logos, but also the Father and the Spirit have become man, since the universal nature of godhead applies to them as much as it does to the Logos).
The mature Herder does not, like the Herder of that early work, rest his case on a general skepticism about the role or discernibility of efficient causation in history.
More generally, however, it has been argued that this whole debate is orthogonal to that over the status of PII since what weak discernibility grounds is merely numerical distinctness, rather than the robust sense of discernibility that PII was originally concerned with (Ladyman and Bigaj 2010).
