Qualia are not intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which their subjects are directly aware, qualities that are necessarily shared by internal duplicates however different their environments may be.
In each of these examples, according to defenders of sense-data theory, there is something of which one is "directly" aware, meaning that one's awareness of it is immediate and does not depend on any inference or judgment.
Again, like all acquaintance theorists, he takes the sort of awareness underlying all foundationally justified belief to be unmediated by any belief or representation, and to guarantee the existence of its object: one cannot be directly aware of something that does not exist.
On option (1), the representationalist would need to offer an explanation of what it is that is so special about ideas that makes it the case that whenever we are perceiving an idea, we are directly aware of that which it represents.
In each case, according to sense-data theorists, there is something of which one is directly aware, and that something is the sense-datum.
In the remainder of this article, sense data are understood in the sense articulated in section 1.1, and the Sense Data Theory is understood simply as the theory that there are such things, that is, that in perception one is directly aware of mind-dependent things that have the properties that perceptually appear to us.
The direct or immediate object of a recollection must surely be something that exists at the time of the memorial event; one can't be directly aware of an entity that doesn't exist.
We can thus re-formulate the Phenomenal Principle espoused by the sense-datum theorists in these terms: If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality F then there is something a sense-datum of which the sense-datum ofectly awhichwhich does possess thet subjecte qualisy.
Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have.
A less radical version concludes instead that we are never directly aware of ordinary objects, but for all that we may be indirectly aware of them.
