Drèze et al. (2008) highlight that this result does not hold in a two-dimensional policy space.
In ordinary interactions, this limitation discourages political decision-makers from addressing high-dimensional policy problems unless incentivized to do so by exogenous "focusing events".
Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors.
Other political structures used to solve bi-dimensional policy decisions in different Social Security contexts are the structural induced equilibrium (see Conde-Ruiz and Profeta 2007; Galasso 2008) or the probabilistic voting (see Profeta 2002).
These results imply that a given rule is only suitable for evaluating finite-dimensional policies whose dimension corresponds to that of the rule, and they provide a rationale for using different rules to pass different policies even within the same organization.
"Pursuing a multi-dimensional foreign policy is not forbidden, and it is neither a crime nor a sin," he told the BBC.
We investigate the design of a flexible two-dimensional warranty policy that contains a number of rectangular regions.
When consumers are unaware about their use rates upon purchase, we consider a fixed two-dimensional warranty policy with a stair-case warranty region and show that it is equivalent to the flexible policy.
Moreover, for higher dimensional datasets, this policy outperforms the best classical policy (MinMax).
In one-dimensional warranty policies, remanufactured item failures can be viewed as random points occurring over a one-dimensional horizon.
In this study, discrete-event simulation was used to optimize the implementation of a one-dimensional renewing warranty policy for remanufactured products.
