A more extreme egalitarianism —"all-luck egalitarianism" to use an apt phrase coined by Shlomi Segall (2010, 46)—has it that "differential option luck should be considered as unjust as differential brute luck" (Segall 2010, 47).
Thus an egalitarian may think that it is bad if people are unequally well off as a result of differential lottery luck even if he has not made up his mind whether people are responsible for differential lottery luck.
Others believe that justice permits but does not require the nullification of the effects of differential option luck.
No doubt, to achieve this, large scale redistribution of income, wealth, etc., might be required, but the elimination of differential brute luck per se is not.
In a third position, justice requires the nullification of some or all effects of differential option luck (e.g. Barry 2008).
Again, the claim that differential option luck is bad is consistent with the view that, given that people do choose to gamble, it is better, all things considered, if differential option luck is not eliminated, even if it would be better, justice-wise, if people had chosen not to gamble in the first place (Lippert-Rasmussen 2001, 576; compare Cohen 2011, 124 143; Persson 2006).
For instance, Marc Fleurbaey argues that justice has a sufficientarian component such that it requires differential option luck outcomes where some people are left very badly off to be eliminated.
For if what really drives egalitarians is the conviction that people should not be worse off than others as a result of causes for which they are not responsible, then, arguably, it follows that differential option luck is unjust.
First, some believe that justice requires the differential effects of option luck not to be nullified.
