Arguably, even where a deontological framework has been adopted, the relevant deontic properties do not subsume, take the place of, provide the basis for, or go hand in hand with, the function-driven (or ends-directed) actions of the persons in question.
Robert Young offers a possible rationale for this point of view in more abstract terms: Those who conceive of morality exclusively, or a least predominantly, within a traditional (deontological) framework claim, that doing something harmful is intrinsically morally wrong – that is, is morally wrong in itself, regardless of any good consequences it may produce.
One peculiar feature of the moral realism of Moore (1992b) is that it is conjoined with a deontological moral theory, yet within a purportedly naturalistic moral realist framework).
While conflicting interests associated with various ethical frameworks may not be fully resolvable (e.g., utilitarian versus deontological approaches), ongoing discussion and deliberation in this area will help provide progress towards a reflective equilibrium in which a degree of ethical coherence and acceptability is acquired.
See also deontological ethics.
Modern ethics, especially since the 18th-century German deontological philosophy of Immanuel Kant, has been deeply divided between a form of teleological ethics (utilitarianism) and deontological theories.
The scandals at Enron, WorldCom and ImClone did not occur because executives were not conversant with the difference between teleological and deontological approaches to resolving ethical questions.
I think the consequential justifications can override the deontological ones, but only if the gains in human freedom are large and the human costs are low.
Meanwhile, the deontological perspective asserts that certain actions – like killing an innocent person – are just wrong, even if they have good consequences.
Deontological theories are normative theories.
