The detailed formal definition of vector commitment can be found in [12].
Any challenge to the definition of 'ontological commitment' provided by Quine's Criterion therefore appears irrelevant to the version of the Fregean argument developed above.
In slightly less than half of the country, the definition of involuntary commitment is expanded to include mandated outpatient programs, a step down from hospitalization.
For example, a literature review by Morrow [ 49] revealed over 25 different definitions of organizational commitment, which indicates the widely varying views of this concept.
(This definition of strong illocutionary commitment generalizes in a straightforward way to the case in which a set of speech acts S1, …, Sn−1 implies a speech act Sn).
This seems likely given Searle and Vanderveken's definition of strong illocutionary commitment: We need only imagine an agent performing some large number of speech acts, S1, …, Sn−1, which, unbeknownst to her, jointly guarantee that she fulfills the seven conditions defining another speech act Sn.
Because accepting a normative definition of "morality" involves this commitment it is not surprising that philosophers seriously disagree about what normative definition to accept.
Quine and many others take Quine's Criterion to be little more than a definition of the term 'ontological commitment' (Quine 1969 and Burgess 2004).
However, Kobasa [ 19] expanded the definition of hardiness to encompass commitment, a sense of meaning, purpose, and perseverance associated with one's existence; control, a sense of autonomy, endurance, and the ability to influence one's own life course; and challenge, the perception of change as a normal aspect of life and as an opportunity for growth (see also [ 20]).
