Decision theorists have reacted in different ways to Allais' Paradox.
Some decision theorists do not omit causation because of metaphysical scruples but for conceptual economy.
Causal decision theorists define expected utility using variants on a proposal by Savage (1972).
Nevertheless, following Richard Jeffrey (1983), most decision theorists suggest that rationality requires that preferences be coherently extendible.
Some decision theorists shun causation because no positivist account specifies its nature.
Causal decision theorists respond that Newcomb's problem is an unusual case that rewards irrationality.
Decision theorists distinguish between choice under uncertainty and choice under risk.
Decision theorists typically assume that a person's behaviour can be fully explained in terms of her beliefs and desires.
Risk-assessment theories in general are popular among rational decision theorists and social contract theorists who presume that people are naturally self-interested.
