In the summative sense, collective self-deception refers to self-deceptive belief shared by a group of individuals, who each come to hold the self-deceptive belief for similar reasons and by similar means, varying according to the account of self-deception followed.
If a unified account is sought, then it seems self-deception cannot require that the self-deceptive belief itself be desired.
In such a case, I unwittingly support my friend's self-deceptive belief and she mine our self-deceptions are mutually reinforcing.
Some non-intentionalists suppose that self-deceivers recognize at some level that their self-deceptive belief p is false, contending that self-deception essentially involves an ongoing effort to resist the thought of this unwelcome truth or is driven by anxiety prompted by this recognition (Bach 1981; Johnston 1988).
Non-intentionalists respond that what distinguishes wishful thinking from self-deception is that self-deceivers recognize evidence against their self-deceptive belief whereas wishful thinkers do not (Bach 1981; Johnston 1988), or merely possess, without recognizing, greater counterevidence than wishful thinkers.
Caring for her as I do, I share many of the anxieties, fears and desires that sustain my friend's self-deceptive belief, and as a consequence I form the same self-deceptive belief via the same mechanisms.
In general, intentionalists hold that self-deceivers are responsible, since they intend to acquire the self-deceptive belief, usually recognizing the evidence to the contrary.
If my anxiety, fear, or desire triggers a process that ineluctably leads me to hold the self-deceptive belief, I cannot be held responsible for holding that belief.
If we think someone like Allison is self-deceived, then self-deception requires neither contradictory beliefs nor intentions regarding the acquisition or retention of the self-deceptive belief.
In the case of collective self-deception, however, the social dimension comes to the fore, since each member of the collective unwittingly helps to sustain the self-deceptive belief of the others in the group.
Mele (2001), however, points out that intentional strategies have their own 'selectivity problem', since it isn't clear why some intentions to acquire a self-deceptive belief succeed while others do not.
