Sentence examples for criteria for knowledge from inspiring English sources

We applied the proposed method to obtain the weights of criteria for knowledge management evaluation by perceptual computing.

But of Plato's three criteria for knowledge, justified, true, belief, (Gettier 1963, Hendricks 2005), epistemic logic really works with only two of them.

(By contrast, methodism begins with criteria for knowledge and justification and then attempts to ascertain whether, on these criteria, we actually have any knowledge or justified beliefs).

Doing so requires overcoming participatory, epistemological and ontological challenges, including different communicative forms, diverging criteria for knowledge validation, and conflicting views of nature.

It may be true, as Plantinga's Reformed epistemology emphasises, that if God exists such experiences meet externalist criteria for knowledge, even though the truth of the beliefs concerned remains open to reflective 'internalist' doubt.

The general aims that integrate features of argumentation are focused on empowering students to talk and to write science as well as on supporting their enculturation into science communities and their acquisition of epistemic criteria for knowledge evaluation.

Plainly, the doctrine presupposes a stringent criterion for knowledge, at least as demanding as the test for techne.

The first prong is that no simple criterion for knowledge (or reliable belief or justified belief) has ever been devised that succeeds in ruling out knowledge of the abstract without thereby ruling out types of knowledge most naturalists would accept (Steiner 1975).

Ideally, rational evaluation of objective evidence and scientific scrutiny of such evaluation should be the criterion for knowledge, not simple authority of the interpreter.

So in the ancient Chinese philosophical context, disputation by its nature brought the participants just a step or two away from fundamental questions concerning how language relates to the world, how we know whether a claim is correct or not, what the criteria are for knowledge, and what makes some analogical inferences correct, others not.

Chapters 1 to 3 effectively follow a developmental series of distinct shapes of consciousness jointly epistemological and ontological attitudes articulated by criteria which are, regarded from one direction, criteria for certain knowledge, and from the other, criteria for the nature of the objects of such knowledge.