Accounts can be given at several levels to explain the correctness of shi/fei judgments.
Among other advantages, moral constructivism relieves moral theory of the burden of having to account for the correctness of moral judgments in terms of their correspondence to a mysterious domain of moral facts (natural or non-natural) that must exist prior to practical reasoning.
"Realism" says that the correctness of moral judgments resides in their truth, and that truth of most fundamental moral principles consists in their corresponding to a moral order (of moral facts or objects) that is antecedent to reason and to principles of practical reasoning.
And defending the correctness of moral judgments on non-ontological grounds has been a constant preoccupation of antirealism (Hare 1952, 1963, 1981; Wright 1992, 6 ff).. Of course, in contrast to antirealists, Kantian constructivists do not see their conception of objectivity as weak or minimalist, because it appeals to the underivative authority of reason (O'Neill 1989).
James Lindemann Nelson argues that internalists who endorse a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation fail to capture the idea that the agent's judgment might come in degrees of confidence in the correctness of her judgment or the exigency of the values involved (2004, 84).
The political crises of that remote kingdom repeatedly offered him opportunities to prove the correctness of his judgment and the promptness of his action, especially in military and economic affairs.
The rebbe's success in working undercover to save the lives of others, inspiring them spiritually, and then in rebuilding Jewish life after the war, affirms the correctness of his judgment.
In some cases the correctness of a judgment of taste may be impossibly difficult to decide.
Cf.: "…if this freedom [of the pen] is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our own judgments, and we are exposed to error" (Anthropology, 7 129).
Substantive realism holds that there are objective criteria of correctness for moral judgments only if such judgments represent matters of fact about the way the world is.
