Results are qualitatively similar when not controlling for tenure and/or experience, although not controlling for either somewhat depresses the coefficient on BA completion since BA recipients in each cohort tend to have had less time in the labor market and thus lower earnings (conditional on degree earned) relative to others of the same age who have accrued more labor market experience.
Other researchers have thus shown that women-authored papers get fewer citations overall than those by men, "even [when] controlling for tenure status, institution, and journal," and men's and women's differing rates of citing themselves "is likely … a driver" of the overall citation gap, they note.
Women move through the faculty ranks more slowly than men and, even when productivity is controlled for, achieve tenure more slowly than men do.
Using the Social Security records and controlling for job tenure, occupational industry and other covariates, the results confirm that permanent workers subject to collective dismissals suffer higher and more permanent wage cuts than those with temporary contracts.
Controlling for: age, tenure, type of institution, educational attainment, rank, employee status and interviewer.
** Controlling for: age, tenure, type of institution, educational attainment, rank and employee status).
We ran a hierarchical regression, controlling for gender, tenure, fulltime versus part-time employment (dummy-coded) and whether or not the respondent has a leading function (dummy coded).
Models control for age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, type of contract (temporary/regular, full/part-time), public/NGO/private sector of the firm, firm size, numeracy skills and field-of-study.
Our estimations control for age (in years) and age squared, tenure at current job (in years) and tenure squared, education (in years), a sex dummy, an urban location dummy, household size, dummies for having a kitchen and water source outside of the dwelling, and initial labor supply.
Additional results not included in the Table 5 show that if we did not control for firm-level contracting and the tenure-size interaction, the largest firm-size premium would be attributed to the lowest education group.
