Sentence examples for contingent state from inspiring English sources

For Aristotle, it is not a contingent state of affairs that S's mind does not realize the form being a tree frog in the way that tree frogs themselves do.

But, where p is a proposition about a future contingent it is not true, whether the contingent state of affairs comes about or not; neither is its negation true; so the disjunction, "p or not-p" is not true.

They are the properties of a thing that may or may not be present, and if actually present, they are causally the result of some contingent state of affairs.

A physical system (or, more precisely, its contingent state) is reduced to the net of relations it entertains with the surrounding systems, and the physical structure of the world is identified as this net of relationships.

Then, where x and y are both essentially omnipotent, and s is some contingent state of affairs that is within the range of omnipotence, x can make y impotent with respect to s (and vice versa).

The actuality of a contingent state of affairs at a specified future time does not exclude the non-temporal possibility of simultaneous alternatives, nor does the truth of a proposition about this state of affairs make it necessary (Glossae super Peri hermeneias IX.520 577; Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae I.7.133 43, I.12.164 223, I.14, 328 353).

But insofar as they are contingent states, he does not know which of the alternatives will be the case.

The study of the structures of the contents of judgment as such, apart from its functions and contingent states, is one of the tasks Stumpf assigns to this part of eidology which he calls the theory of states of affairs.

Scotus takes it as an obvious fact that there are contingent states of affairs which could have not been at that very moment of time at which they are (Ord. I.2.1.1 2, 86).

Because of the wide disparity among contingent states of affairs, (a - f), one might despa - ff finding an analysis oneomighttence that both despairatisfactofily with all ofinding stanes of analysisand implies that an ofnipomnipotence has, inthatively speaking, sufficient power.

The arguments have been based on the denial of all actual infinities or on the acceptance of some infinities (for instance, the coherence of supposing there to be infinitely many stars) combined with the rejection of an infinite regress of explanations solely involving contingent states of affairs.