Sentence examples for contents of representations from inspiring English sources

Hutto (2013) argues that action-oriented accounts of representation cannot offer a viable notion of causally relevant content because "the contents of representations do not make a causal difference, only formal or vehicular properties do;" when one assumes computationalism, then the only causally relevant factors are forms of symbols in computers, irrelevant of their semantics.

In particular, it is proposed that the posterior brain regions play a general role in maintaining the actual contents of representations, as the delay-period activity is correlated with the numbers of objects held in WM (Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004).

The content of representations in abstract thought might then, it might be proposed, be derived from their role in perception.

That is, it does not seem to be a necessary condition on the nonconceptual content of representations in general that they be insulated from the propositional attitudes; at least in the case of personal level representations this necessity condition fails.

This same analysis of our power of representation also claims to establish the distinction between the form and content of representations, the necessity of both receptivity and spontaneity on the part of the power of representation, the necessary multiplicity of sensations, and the unknowability of things in themselves.

Millikan makes use of these extended senses in which items may have functions to try to explain the contents of novel representations and representations that are produced as a result of learning.

In humans, whilst functional imaging has shown that fronto-parietal areas are activated by a range of different cognitive demands, the actual content of representation remains unclear.

One might try to explain linguistic meaning directly in terms of the contents of mental representations, perhaps by thinking of language processing as pairing linguistic expressions with mental representations; one could then think of the meaning of the relevant expression for that individual as being inherited from the content of the mental representation with which it is paired.

Just as proponents of Gricean and convention-based theories typically view their theories as only the first stage in an analysis of meaning because they analyze meaning in terms of another sort of mental representation so proponents of mental representation-based theories will typically seek to provide an independent analysis of contents of mental representations.

A novel strategy that has emerged in the wake of J.J.C. Smart's discussions of identity theory is the suggestion that these apparent features of experience are not genuine properties "in the mind" or "in the world" but only the contents of mental representations (perhaps in a language of thought).

The contents of mental representations are typically taken to be abstract objects (properties, relations, propositions, sets, etc).