It is a structured way of observing and describing a patient's current state of mind, under the domains of appearance, attitude, behavior, mood and affect, speech, thought process, thought content, perception, cognition, insight and judgment.
For example, the argument from the fine grained nature of experience generally begins by arguing that one need not have the concepts involved in the correct specification of the content of perception in order to undergo a perception with that content, e.g., one need not have the concept red27 in order to have a perception correctly specifiable in terms of such a concept.
Most contemporary uses of "the contents of perception" take such contents to be analogous to the contents of a newspaper story, rather than the contents of a bucket.
Such a way of specifying the representational content of perception gives us the propositional content of perception.
Appealing to a way in which the property of being a square is perceived is in conflict with Tye's coarse-grained account of the content of perception which is required for his broader representationalist account of conscious perception (see the entry on the contents of perception (section 7) and the entry on representational theories of consciousness).
However, if one is persuaded by the "state" view of the nonconceptual debate, then it is possible to hold that the content of perception is exhausted by the propositional contents of the perceptual beliefs perception would give rise to, though having the perception does not depend on the organism's conceptual capacities (i.e., perception is a concept-independent state).
Arguments for the nonconceptual content of perception usually proceed via demonstration of the concept-independence of perception.
Thus even if the conceptualists manage to show that subjects do possess all the concepts involved in the correct specification of the content of perception, it still does not show that the content of perception is conceptual, it only undercuts the motivation the nonconceptualist can obtain from the fineness of grain argument (Coliva 2003, Bermúdez 2007).
The intentional content of perception is sometimes called "perceptual content" (see the entry on the contents of perception).
New York's Photo League lasted only fifteen years, from 1936 to 1951, but its impact on the style, content, and perception of photography in America is regularly reassessed.
By Vince Aletti New York's Photo League lasted only fifteen years, from 1936 to 1951, but its impact on the style, content, and perception of photography in America is regularly reassessed.
