Sentence examples for content of a name from inspiring English sources

In Kripke, the descriptive content of a name does not determine denotation or reference.

Because the Millian-Russellian says that the content of a name is its referent, the Millian-Russellian seems forced into saying that empty names lack a content.

On such views, the semantic content of a name, or the contribution it makes to the meaning or truth conditions of a sentence, depends only on the individual picked out by that name.

We know that, whatever the content of a name is, it must be something which determines as a reference the object for which the name stands; and we know that, if Fregeanism is true, this must be something other than the object itself.

As the theory is usually understood, it is the position that the semantic content of a name or other directly referring expression is nothing more than the referent: the referent is all that the name contributes to a proposition expressed by a sentence containing it.

The machine can perform two basic operations, namely: add one to the content of a named register (which we will symbolize as n+, where n is the name of the register) and (attempt to) subtract one from a named register, with two possible outcomes: a success branch if the register was initially non-zero, and a failure branch if the register was initially zero (we will symbolize the operation as n-).

On some traditional descriptivist theories of proper names, the content of a proper name can be expressed by a purely qualitative definite description, which is a definite description that does not contain any directly-referential terms (such as proper names and indexicals, if these are directly-referential).

According to the Millian-Russellian, (21) and (22) differ only in the substitution of expressions with have the same content: after all, 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' are proper names which refer to the same object, and the Millian-Russellian holds that the content of a proper name is the object to which that name refers.

If follows that no one definite description seems suitable to capture the content of a proper name.

Twardowski, however, says that the content is a mental picture, but he also identifies the mental content with the meaning of a name and with Bolzano's objective representation (idea), i.e., the representation (idea) as such [Vorstellung an sich].

Money has begun to come back to some of the old families; and money, it is said, has become a motive where once people were content with the antiquity of a name.