We already saw that, especially in types 3 and 4 situations, this top-down approach may provide some guidance, but stakeholders in the collective choice setting may still face a wicked deadlock, calling for a constitutional level intervention.
Current policy initiatives in the Netherlands demonstrate how state-government may, also outside of the Dutch example, consider making changes in the institutional environment of the heat energy sector as a constitutional level intervention towards greater bottom-up legal governance orchestration.
This may give rise to a bottom-up constitutional level intervention in orchestration at collective choice level, away from our default assumption of an absence of top-down orchestration by constitutional silence, leaving collective choice on establishing heat infrastructures to the mere interplay between stakeholders as stakeholders see fit.
This wasn't Al Qaeda striking just anywhere: it was Al Qaeda striking in Libya, a country where the Obama White House launched a not-precisely-constitutional military intervention with a not-precisely-clear connection to the national interest.
Constitutional regulatory interventions could also declare dominance of some party within a types 3 or 4 situation.
Before we reconsider such express constitutional level interventions, the below Table 4 presents the collective choice typology overview, built upon Table 2, based upon top-down legal governance.
From the Dutch Heat Vision [3] of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, it becomes clear that the central Dutch government is considering specific constitutional level interventions towards a more distinct positioning of certain stakeholders, to further effective orchestration within the regulated heat market.
The possibility of constitutional level interventions, to remedy legal governance failure at operational and/or collective choice levels, to secure effective, efficient, legitimate, and lawful heat infrastructures, typically comes with a general and abstract legislative form; directed at anyone involved in any case of setting-up, operating, and maintaining heat infrastructures.
But if Louisiana continues to be indifferent to and flaunt constitutional norms, Supreme Court intervention again is mandated.
Where such failure is not solved by operational level stakeholders agreeing on a feasible and legitimate top-down scenario, constitutional level regulatory interventions may be needed.
