Sentence examples for consciousness access from inspiring English sources

One can refer specifically to phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, reflexive or meta-mental consciousness, and narrative consciousness among other varieties.

In today's discussions of consciousness, it is fairly common to mark out even further distinctions to identify which aspect of the problem one is addressing (creature consciousness, state consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, etc).

A third, more technical notion of consciousness, access consciousness, has been introduced by Block (1995) to capture the sense in which mental representations may be poised for use in rational control of action or speech.

For more clarity regarding the consciousness-intentionality relationship and how these three topics figure prominently in views about it, it is necessary now to turn attention back to philosophical disagreements regarding consciousness that are much bound up with the distinctions mentioned in Section (1), among phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and reflexive/monitoring consciousness.

A third (advocated by Bayne and Chalmers, pp. 38 9) would be to urge that while there is clearly a breach in the unity of access consciousness (access to information for purposes of belief formation, behavioural control, and so on) during the period of the split, phenomenal unity may still extend across all the conscious experience.

He was attracted to meditation by the promise of deeper insight into consciousness -- access to the mind's hidden, transcendent potentialities.

Daniel Dennett (1988 , 1991 2001) has been the most consistent advocate of the view that the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has been overrated and that qualia ought to 'quined,' i.e., resolutely denied and dispensed with.

In so far the various sorts of consciousness, e.g., access, phenomenal, meta-mental, are distinct and separable which remains an open question they likely also differ in their specific roles and values.

The distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (i.e., a conscious state that is not entirely private) justifies the distinction between a purely phenomenological approach to consciousness, and the approach typical of scientific psychology and neurosciences.

A third clarification has been Ned Block's (1995) distinction between access consciousness (or A-consciousness) and phenomenal consciousness (or P-consciousness).

The causal relationships implicit in definitions of access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness are made explicit, and the corresponding causal relationships at the more detailed levels of perception, memory, and skill learning described.