Sentence examples for conscious representations from inspiring English sources

The second is to suggest a wide-ranging set of computational methods for building competent machinery that benefits from the flexibility of conscious representations.

As he reasonably points out, logic comprises the rules of correct thinking, and the principles of logic are known to us as conscious representations;[86] thinking and consciousness are objects of psychological inquiry; therefore any account of logic must include a psychological description of the genesis of logical principles (L I: 13).

That is, as we saw, because the soul (the terms, "psyche" and "soul", will be used interchangeably in this article) is postulated to be simple and "originally an utter tabula rasa, without any life or thought" (SW VI: 120), the evident multiplicity of conscious representations generates a paradox (PsW: 171).

As he points out, the other two states in which representations might find themselves, viz., repressed and sinking, cannot serve to explain the conscious representations involved in feeling and desiring, since they are ex hypothesi either outside of or vanishing from consciousness.

Some influential theories of consciousness maintain that the allocation of attention is restricted to conscious representations [1, 2].

Ego identity manifests itself "in conscious representations of the self, others, and the world in general, and in identifications with social groups, cultural norms, ideals, and values" [ 12], p. 346.

In other words, conscious representation results from the suppression of what has no interest for bodily functions and the conservation only of what does interest bodily functions.

The representation of an object in sensible space means nothing other than the deliberate and conscious representation of muscular sensations thought necessary to reach the object (Poincaré 1902: 82; 1913b: 70).

The present study extends earlier findings [24], [29] to identify right anterior insula as a substrate through which cognitive processes are coloured by conscious representation of feelings.

This sort of "transient blindsight" suggests that many ordinary perceptual decisions – not necessarily motor – can be effectively taken when our sluggish conscious representation of the world is still a void or a faint impression.

That this can happen is a well-known empirical fact but that it can originate in basic automatic visual operations that precede conscious representation is surprising and in some sense worrying as it seems to work against the scientific ideal that careful observation is sufficient to reach agreements about basic facts and what we consider reality.