By contrast, for Gregory, insolubles are just false, not ambiguous at all; they correspond to a single false conjunction, one conjunct of which is true and the other false.
If you knew such a conjunction, the second conjunct would have to be true, which conflicts with your knowing the first conjunct.
For example, when evaluating a conjunction, the second conjunct is evaluated in a local context which contains not only the information in the global context, but also whatever information was given by the first conjunct.
In applying D3 to states of affairs like (e) and (f) it should be observed that a conjunct of a conjunctive state of affairs is a part of such a complex state of affairs.[4] As intended, D3 does not require an omnipotent agent to have the power to bring about either impossible or necessary states of affairs, or states of affairs such as (a - f).
First, premise 4 seems to have originated with Chatton, and he was followed in this by the next generation of Oxford theologians, for example, Robert Holcot.[11] Second, even if we accept this argument, Chatton still owes us an explanation of what the first conjunct means in the conjunction 'God knows a AND "a is" will be true'.
If one assumption is a conjunction, replace it by a conjunct of your choice, if a universal quantification, by an instance.
This theorem says roughly that if you know a conjunction, then you know each conjunct.
For instance, the revised rule for conjunctions is to assign the conjunction the same truth-value as the conjunct with the lowest truth-value.
Fourth, while (e) is unrestrictedly repeatable, it is a complex state of affairs, namely, a conjunctive state of affairs whose second conjunct is not repeatable.
K3 says that i knows a conjunction if, and only if, i knows each conjunct.
But (25b) is a conjunction, so we must first update with the left conjunct (25c), and then with the right (25d).
