Satisfying some baseline conditions of responsibility as attributability would appear to be necessary in order to be responsible in the sense of accountable.
Some, for instance, are concerned with the notion of pleasure as a good and pain as an evil; with pleasure as a supplement of activity supporting its connection with happiness; with the relation between virtues and vices; with virtue as a mean; and with the concept of the involuntary and the conditions of responsibility.
(Berofsky 1995, p. 199) Though Fischer and Ravizza, Wolf, and Nelkin argue that responsiveness to reasons is necessary condition of moral responsibility, in presenting and defending their views, they suggest that unless an agent satisfies this condition, she does not really govern herself.
Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.
Moreover, under the condition of high responsibility to continue thinking, emotional intensity tended to reduce later GAD symptoms.
The Secretary shall not require a State, as a condition of assuming responsibility under this section, to forego project delivery methods that are otherwise permissible for highway projects.
But he does not do away with group intentions as a necessary condition of collective responsibility.
Such a libertarian view holds that it is a necessary condition of moral responsibility that the act was not necessitated or caused.
To cause harm to another is also not a sufficient condition of legal responsibility, even in the eyes of those, such as the early Epstein, who would in general favour making agents strictly liable for the harm they cause.
A second reason why causing harm is not a necessary condition of legal responsibility is that there are many contexts in which a person is civilly or criminally responsible irrespective of whether any harm has been caused by their conduct or that of an agency for which they are responsible.
