A familiar assumption in much linguistic semantics is that meanings are to be identified conceptually as, or as subparts of, the conceptual representations deployed in general cognitive processes.
There has also been dissent from the traditional claim that conceptual representations (thoughts, beliefs) lack phenomenology.
Finally, after this is done, there is an assumption of commonality with other conceptual representations.
Such conceptual representations have tended to differ from logical ones in several respects.
We present an approach for creating conceptual representations of human-made indoor environments using mobile robots.
(Bottom) Conceptual representations of the viscoelastic structure; the colored areas represent the viscoelastic media.
a and d Conceptual representations of the viscoelastic structure; the colored area represents the viscoelastic media.
Mental exclusions are conceptual representations that relate to the appearances or representations of entities, as discussed by Dignāga.
These conceptual representations are misconstrued to be the actual objects since the actual objects do not exist in them.
Object exclusions are not conceptual representations of mere appearances or representations, but rather can relate to the real world.
The neural mechanisms underlying this initial ability to map words onto conceptual representations remain relatively unknown.
