In the middle years of the twentieth century some philosophers even asserted, on conceptual grounds, that political obligation needs no justification.
As we have argued elsewhere [ 46], there is a clear need for more debate and conceptual development regarding any obligation to disclose individual research results to research participants.
By actively seeking input from a combination of primary and secondary stakeholders we were able to capture a broad range of information from the practical and highly-specific (advising how study clinics might be more effectively and appropriately implemented) to the conceptual (researchers' moral and ethical obligations to trial participants, their families and the broader community).
It then turns, in Part II, to the conceptual questions raised by political obligation, such as what it means for an obligation to be political.
This discussion provides a bridge between the conceptual analysis of law and obligation, in Book I, and the following chapter (II.2) on the natural state, which leads in turn to the derivation of the natural law in DJN II.3.
It is one of the fundamental conceptual uncertainties complicating the putative obligation to disclose [ 46].
We first ask how the practice determines rights and obligations, which is a conceptual or otherwise nonmoral question that aims to identify the legally relevant aspects of institutional practice.
It is in this sort of way that Feyerabend wanted to "identify" the mind with the brain: he simply rejected the ordinary mentalistic conceptual scheme and so felt no obligation to show its compatibility with materialism.
Some even argued that the existence of political obligations could be established by conceptual analysis alone — a point we return to in §3.
The conceptual framework refers to WFD-specific needs and obligations and is intended for regional, national and international (EU) authorities and organisations responsible for implementing the WFD and developing river basin management plans.
His methodological purpose was to describe human practices, and he wanted to defend a conceptual separation between law and morality — a distinction in kind between legal obligation and moral obligation (see Hart 1994, 239 240).
