Due to the central position of the notion of sign in his logic, one is entitled to characterize Ockham's logic as "ruled by the concept of sign" ("régie par le concept de signe") (Biard 1989, 102).
According to Bacon, the concept of sign belongs to the category of relation.
Unlike Ockham's semantic concept of sign, the one favored by the later authors is predominantly pragmatic.
In 12th- and early 13th-century logical textbooks the concept of sign does not play an important role yet.
The criticism of modist grammar is based on a fundamental redefinition of the concept of sign, coming about after the mid-13th century.
What, despite all the differences, logical authors from the 14thcentury on generally have in common is their awareness of the importance of the concept of sign — even though, of course, there were exceptions to this rule.
Contrary to Ockham's concept of sign, it is not the logical function of referring to a significatum that stands in the foreground, but rather the sign's relation to a cognitive power.
The concept of sign, a portent observed in the physical world, which indicates future events, is found in all ancient cultures, but was first developed in ancient Mesopotamian texts.
The concept of sign, thus defined in terms of a triadic relation (a sign is always a sign of something to some mind), provides the general basis for Augustine's theory of language: "To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice" (Loqui est articulata voce signum dare) (Augustine De dial. 1975, 86).
